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Abstract
We estimate the effect of revealing expert opinion labels on wine product purchases
through a field experiment where a random subset of wine products within the con-
sumers’ retail shelf choice set are labeled in the treatment store. We use a detailed
weekly product level panel scanner data set for labeled and unlabeled wines in the
treatment and comparable control stores before and after the implementation of a
product-level labeling field experiment. We combine the scanner data with additional
information on the characteristics of each product, such as brand, varietal, region of
production, and price to estimate the average and heterogeneous effects of the field
experiment on wine consumption. Consistent with earlier work, we find there to be a
positive and significant overall average effect and that demand increases more for higher
score wines than for lower score wines. We advance the literature with the following:
one, higher scores matter more for prices in the lower quartile of the overall wine price
distribution whereas demand does not move for the higher priced wine quartile, once
quality is revealed; the result is consistent with pre treatment consumer behavior where
consumers infer high quality for high prices. Two, we find positive spillover effects of
this experimental treatment within brand for untreated wines as the displayed average
score of the wine brand increases. However, we also obtain negative spillover effects
for untreated wines that belong to intensively treated brands.
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1 Introduction
There is a relatively large theoretical literature that discusses the ways in which informed
consumers and expert opinion may solve adverse selection problems (Akerlof, 1970, Bagwell
and Riordan 1991). Despite the growing body of empirical work that has applied this theory
to the data (Hilger et al, 2011, Sorensen and Rasmussen, 2004, Reinstein and Snyder, 2005),
there remains an empirical gap where actual consumer revealed choices are used to test the
theoretical mechanisms that underlie the ways in which consumers make inferences about the
quality of products with and without expert opinion information. This is particularly true
for products where producers use observable attributes such as price and brand advertising
to signal quality as theory predicts in an asymmetric information and repeated interaction
context (see e.g., Bagwell and Riordan, 1991, Mahenc, 2004, Shapiro, 1983, Spence, 1976,
and Tellis and Wernerfelt, 1987). The contributions of this paper are to first to investigate
whether expert opinions, in the form of an expert score, affect demand for labeled and
unlabeled wine products in the context of incomplete information about wine quality, and
second to test for some economic mechanisms about the consumers belief and find evidence
on how consumers use information about observable characteristics to infer the quality of
products.
To analyze this question, we use purchase decisions from a retail field experiment in
which we label a random subset of scored wine products in one treated store and do not
label those same scored products in comparable control stores. Furthermore, we do not
label in either the treatment or control stores the remaining scored products that were not
selected, nor the products without available scores. We use a detailed monthly product
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level panel scanner data set for labeled and unlabeled products at treatment and control
stores before and after the implementation of a shelf labeling field experiment. We combine
the scanner data with detailed product specific attribute information readily available to all
consumers through information on the product, such as wine brand, varietal, and region of
production, as well as the price. Using revealed consumer preferences, the objective of this
paper is first to estimate the average and heterogeneous effects of the field experiment on
wine consumption of treated (scored and labeled) products, unlabeled products with scores,
and unlabeled products without scores. Moreover, we investigate heterogeneous treatment
effects according to product characteristics such as price range or regions of production. We
also test for evidence of spillover effects among products of the same brands or same varietals
to reveal possible mechanisms behind how consumers make inferences about the quality of
products they buy given observable product attributes in the choice set.
This paper uses the same experimental design as Hilger et al. (2011), but extends the
analysis to to data beyond treated (scored and labeled) wines to a larger set that includes
unlabeled wines with scores, and unlabeled wines without scores. We match the treatment
store to control stores, making sure all three subgroups of wines (treated, unlabeled with
scores, and unlabeled wines without scores) share common pre period trends in the treatment
and control stores. Our contribution is to extend Hilger et al. (2011) to an investigation of
incomplete information through testing the possible mechanisms behind how consumers form
beliefs about product quality when making their revealed choices given available information.
While Hilger et al. (2011) documented a carefully identified causal positive average effect of
expert opinions on wine demand, especially for higher scores, and no average effect on the
unlabeled wines, we dig deeper in this paper to try and understand why this is so, and how
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consumers incorporate the new information in deciding what future choices to make. For
instance, we test whether there are positive or negative spillover effects on sales of unlabeled
products that belong to the same brand or varietal as labeled products.
Our estimates suggest there to be a positive and significant overall average effect and
that demand increases more for higher score wines than for lower score wines (as in Hilger
et al., 2011). New results are suggestive that higher scores matter more for prices in the
lower quartile of the overall wine price distributions, which rejects consumers previously
perceiving low price as signaling high quality. Our findings are instead consistent with
consumer behavior where demand does not move for higher price quartiles once quality is
revealed as consumers infer high quality for high prices. We also find positive spillover effects
of this experimental treatment within brand for untreated wines, especially if the average
score of wines within brand is high. However, if there is a higher percentage of wines within
a given brand that are treated, that is the brand is intensively treated, we find that there
are significant negative spillovers for untreated wines.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature
of consumer belief. Section 3 presents the experimental setting and the data. Section 4
the empirical strategy to estimate the effects of displaying labels on average and by product
attributes to test theories of belief formations in the absence of quality information. Section
5 presents and discusses the findings and section 6 concludes.
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2 Background Literature on Consumers Beliefs
There is a large empirical literature on understanding consumer beliefs about product quality
through experimental analyses. In the drink and food markets, the perception of quality can
be measured using two different scales: one for intrinsic attributes and one for extrinsic
attributes (Jover et al., 2004). However, in the empirical modeling of real choice situations,
only the extrinsic characteristics of the food products can be used to infer the quality of
products. Among extrinsic characteristics, consumers may consider the price, brand name,
country-of origin, and promotional activities of the products in their choice set (Ozretic-
Dosen et al., 2007; Schnettler et al., 2009; Jover et al., 2004). Veale and Quester (2009) show
that price and the country-of-origin effects could be more important than some intrinsic
characteristics as taste in the wine market. Palma et al (2013) show that price is a key
attribute in the contribution of expected quality by the consumer before tasting the product.
Gustafson et al. (2016) uses an valuation experiment to show that consumers own knowledge
affects preferences for wine products. However this literature is based on stated choices. The
revealed choice approach has the advantage of ‘face validity’, as the data are consumers’
actual choices when faced with real constraints on their own resources and the products
available (Hensher et al., 1998; Whitehead et al., 2008). Consumers consider the internal
costs and benefits of their potential choices and experience the consequences of their actions.
Carson et al. (1996) shows through meta-analysis that estimates from stated and revealed
preferences differ.
Empirical literature using revealed choices has analyzed the extent to which product
quality information affects consumer behavior including branding (Montgomery and Wern-
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erfelt, 1994), mandatory product labeling (Jin and Leslie, 2003; Kiesel and Villas-Boas,
2007), experimental labeling (Kiesel and Villas-Boas, 2007), and advertising (Ackerberg,
2003). Closely related to our paper, besides Hilger et al. (2011) are papers by Sorensen and
Rasmussen (2004) for the book market, Reinstein and Snyder (2005) for the movie industry
and Friberg and Gronqvist (2012) for the wine market. The key identification of the effects
of expert opinion on movie demand in Reinstein and Snyder (2005) results from exploiting
the timing of movie reviews by Siskel and Ebert. While they find no overall effect of reviews,
they show that positive reviews increased box office revenues for narrowly-released movies
and dramas, although it remains to be explained why. In the book industry, Sorensen and
Rasmussen (2004) find that both positive and negative reviews in the New York Times in-
crease book sales. Friberg and Gronqvist (2012) show that expert opinions affect the demand
for wines in Sweden using five years of weekly data on sales, advertising, and expert reviews.
A positive review raises the demand by more than 6% the week after but the effect gradu-
ally decreases and eventually becomes insignificant after twenty weeks. While all empirical
evidence thus far seems to point out that expert opinions have a demand effect beyond just
raising product awareness, the mechanism as to why remains to be explained.
Some theoretical works investigated those mechanisms. Price and brand advertising can
be used by firms to signal quality in an asymmetric information and repeat interaction
context (see Bagwell and Riordan, 1991, Mahenc, 2004, Shapiro, 1983, Spence, 1976, and
Tellis and Wernerfelt, 1987). Shapiro (1983) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) find that
high prices signal quality if consumers attribute high quality to seeing a high price (as in
Shapiro, 1983) and there is a proportion of informed consumers who buy if quality is good,
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unless there are too many uninformed buyers in the market.1 If that is so, revealing high
scores for high priced wines will have less effect than revealing high scores for lower priced
similar wines. However, if a low price signals high quality through promotions to induce
trial and repeated purchases once quality is assessed, for example as in Mahenc (2004),
Spence (1976), and Tellis and Wernerfelt (1987), then high scores for high price wines may
have a larger effect on demand than high scores for low price wines (that consumers had
initially inferred as being good quality in prior to the additional label information). Gneezy
et al. (2014) focused on price -dependant quality expectations with a theoretical model
combined with lab experiments and show that expectations are important drivers of the
price-quality relationship. Revealing information on a product could also lead to spillover
effects on other products. Indeed, product brand information could improve the reputation
of other products within the same brand. Costanigro et al. (2010) show that there exists
a relationship between price and the structure of the name (collective and specific) and
reputation in the wine market.
The objective of this paper is to empirically test theories of equilibrium price and quantity
in the context of asymmetric information. For instance, we investigate whether the change
in quantity purchased occurs among low or high priced wines. We apply those tests to the
wine market where consumers choose the wine product that maximize their utility, where a
1In Shapiro (1983) to prevent adverse selection the incentive compatible equilibrium price-quality schedule
(that prevents low quality to sell at high price and imitate being good quality) involves high quality products
selling at a premium above their cost, so that this premium compensates the cost of providing the high
quality product to all informed consumers and to a proportion of randomly purchasing uninformed consumers
(Shapiro, 1983). Bagwell and Riordan (1991) show that the high quality producers price decreases as more
consumers are informed.
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product is a bundle of attributes. In the context of asymmetric information and a choice set
that has wine products with different combinations of product attributes, consumers infer
product quality based on the combination of those attributes and how they affect utility. In
the asymmetric information literature, experts are considered informed consumers and the
empirical test is whether uninformed consumers incorporate the information from experts
when assessing the quality of goods. Wine is an experience good, in that consumers only
realize it’s quality after consumption, and sometimes even after consumption consumers may
not really fully appreciate its quality (Ali and Nauges, 2007). There may a role for experts to
reveal their opinion on wine product quality in order to help consumers make choices given
the choice set of wine products with different prices, attributes, and the additional expert
scores.
3 The Experimental Setting and the Data
Wine scores from a proprietary wine scoring system were displayed in the treatment store
for four weeks during the month of April 2006. We use a proprietary score wine data set
to randomly label 150 wine products with score labels that were attached below the price
tag every week by the research team. It is important to note that not all wines with scores
received a label. More specifically, 325 scored wines remained unlabeled. In addition, there
remained nearly 613 wines in the choice set of consumers that were not scored by the experts.
Therefore three subgroups of wines are present in the: 1) labeled wines with scores (14%
of the choice set), 2) unlabeled wines with scores (28% of the choice set), and 3) unlabeled
wines without scores (58% of the choice set).
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Each label features the name of the proprietary scoring system and the wine’s score that,
in theory, ranges from the lowest 50 to the highest score of 100, but scores less than 70 are
not released by the rating agency. Figure 1 displays the kernel density of the score histogram
for labeled and unlabeled wines with scores in the treated store on the left panel and for
the control stores on the right panel. Given a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for equality
of the distributions for both the labeled and unlabeled panels and a KS estimate of 0.0987
for the Treated Store with a p-value of 0.481 and a KS estimate of 0.0935 with a p-value of
0.518 for the Control Stores, we can not reject the equality of the score distribution between
the labeled and unlabeled status of wines. There is therefore a nice match in the whole
distribution of labeled and unlabeled wines in the treatment store and in the control stores
which supports the difference in differences estimation strategy for the identification of the
effect of score label.
The treatment store is located in a wealthy suburban neighborhood and is in the same
marketing division as a set of 38 potential control stores.2 The shared marketing division
means that the pricing, promotion, and display layout is common among the treatment and
control stores. This contributes to a good balance of observable determinants of quantities
of wine sold that originate from the retail marketing strategy.
2Like in Hilger et al, (2011) on the one hand, if consumers in wealthy areas are likely to be more fully informed
regarding wine quality than consumers in other areas, one could argue that we have a low likelihood of finding
a significant treatment effect. On the other hand, if consumers in wealthier areas care more about quality
and expert reviews, we would have a higher likelihood of finding an effect.
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3.1 The Data
The data set consists of records for all wine products purchased in a certain week by store,
from March 2003 until May 2006, which we will aggregate to the product by month by store
level for our analysis. In particular, we observe purchase data by store and by week for 102
products among the 150 wine products for which we attached labels to the price tag every
week. For the sub-sample of 325 scored wines that remained unlabeled, we observe purchase
records for 230 products. In addition, we have purchase records for 610 of the 613 wines in
the choice set of consumers that were not scored by the experts. Overall, we have purchase
data for all wine products in the treatment store and a set of potential control stores, among
which we will use only the four that best match the treatment store’s pre period trends in
labeled, unlabeled, and unscored wines, as we will show next.3 The scanner data provide a
unique wine product code identifier (UPC), the brand name and varietal of the wine, the
number of bottles sold, the pre discount price paid, and any retail discount pricing offered.
We aggregate the weekly sales data to the month-level for each unique product code and
store to generate the number of bottles, average shelf price, average price paid (the shelf price
net of discounts), and whether a bottle of wine was discounted. Pricing and discounting for
each product are common for all the stores in the data and, moreover, wine pricing was not
updated due to the selection of products into labeled and unlabeled status. Lastly, prices
3We use past data to match the treated store and possible controls based on similar pre trends not only for
the labeled products but also for unlabeled scored produts and unlabeled unscored products unlike in Hilger
at al (2011) where more control stores are used.
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were not differentially updated in the treated store due to our experiment.4
For those wines for which proprietary wine score data exist, we merge the wine score
data with the scanner data. Detailed product attribute data including: brand of the wine
product, varietal (for example Cabernet or Merlot), aggregate wine type (red, white, or
other), and origin of production and imported status is merged with the scanner data set.
We use data for multiple months before the treatment window to investigate pre period
trends. As reported in Table 1, in the treatment store, we have data on 2,562 product month
observations for treated wine products, 5,721 observations for untreated wine products with
scores, and 16,194 observations for unscored wine products. In the four control stores the
total number of observations for the three treatment status subgroups of wine products
are 11,058, 24,578, and 72,871 respectively. The three product subgroups have the same
proportion of observations across the treatment and control stores.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 and organized by store and wine treatment
group as follows. In the first three columns we report descriptive statistics in the treatment
store for treated/labeled wines in column 1, unlabeled wines with scores in column 2, and
untreated wines without scores in column 3. Columns 4, 5, and 6 report descriptive statistics
for the control stores for the respective three wine and score groups.
In the first row we report average quantity sold during the pre treatment month (March);
this is followed by its standard deviation in the second row. Below that the average quantity
sold during the treatment month (April), followed by its standard deviation. Average quan-
4While in our empirical setting the price does not change due to experimental labels, it is worth noting that
an extensive stream of the literature is related to the effect of experts opinion on wine prices (Dubois and
Nuages, 2010; Hadj Ali et al., 2010)
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tity sold by product in pre treatment month is 17 bottles for labeled wines in the treatment
store and 19.2 bottles in the control stores on average. Unlabeled wines with scores sell
25.6 bottles on average in the pre treatment month in the treated store and 29.1 bottles in
the control stores on average. Finally unscored wines sell about 12 bottles by product in
the treated store and 13.4 bottles by product in the control stores during the pre treatment
month. Average prices in the pre treatment month, as well treatment month, and all treat-
ment statuses are not statistically different from one another. Most of the wine consumers
purchase is discounted in the both the pre treatment and treatment months: approximately
90 percent for treated wines (in both treatment and control stores), almost one hundred
percent for untreated wines with scores, and approximately 75 percent for untreated wines
without scores.
The next two rows of Table 1 reports the average and standard deviation of scores
by treatment status for treated and control stores. Here we see that average scores at
the treatment store are not statistically different between the treated wines and untreated
wines, with scores of approximately 83 and standard deviations of roughly 3.2. This is
corroborated by Figure 1’s reporting of similar score distributions among treatment status
for the treatment and the control stores.
The next two rows report the composition of red and white wines for each store and wine
treatment group pair. For wines within the treatment store the treated group consists of 58
percent red wines, the untreated with score group consists of 45 percent, while the unscored
group contains 50 percent red wine; a similar distribution characterizes the control stores.
Similarly, white wine and other (not reported in Table 1) proportions by treatment status
are similar between the treatment store and control stores.
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3.2 Pre Period Trends in Treatment and Control Stores
To estimate the causal effect of revealing score information on a random subset of wines
with scores on the three different subgroups of wine products as defined by treatment status,
we need to verify that one crucial assumption is satisfied - that there are similar pre period
trends for the treatment and the control stores used in the analysis.
First we investigate whether the pre period is balanced in terms of pre existing trends in
total quantity sold of wine products for the treated store and control stores. Figure 2 presents
the total quantity sold by store per month for the year preceding the treatment, where the
treatment is indicated by vertical line. While the various stores differ in levels of quantity
sold, their trends are quite similar. While the treatment store has a lower total quantity
of wine sold than each control store, the trends for wine quantity purchases follow similar
patterns in the treatment store and the four control stores.5 Thus, while the treatment store
has different quantities sold than the control stores, to the extent that these differences are
constant over time, store fixed effects will control for all possible time invariant determinants
of wine demand at the store level.
We repeat in Figure 2 the graphical analysis for the treated (labeled) products only, and,
once again, while there is a lower quantity of wine products sold in the treatment store than
in each controls store, the pre treatment trends follow each other closely. This pattern is also
5As a more rigorous test of parallel trends, we regress quantity on a time trend for the treatment and control
stores separately. We find that the point estimates of the trend coefficients in treatment and control stores are
not statistically different from each other. Furthermore, the time series correlation of the sample averages of
treated and the control stores is high, suggesting that the treatment and control stores share broadly similar
time varying patterns in the pre treatment period.
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evident for untreated wines with scores and for the unscored wines, respectively. In sum,
for all the subgroups, the trends are quite similar in the treated and control store which will
allow us to investigate the causal effects of the treatment on treated wines, untreated wines
with scores, and untreated wines without scores.
4 Reduced Form Empirical Specification
Using two data sets, a store level and a product characteristics data set, we estimate a reduced
form revealed preference specification of consumer responses to the labeling treatment. In
particular, we extend Hilger et al. (2011) measuring average and heterogeneous changes
in wine consumption depending on wine characteristics to test theoretical predictions of
consumer inferences about product quality, by taking advantage of the exogenous changes
in information about product attributes introduced through the field experiment.
4.1 Global identification strategy
We follow a difference-in differences-approach (DID) commonly used in the policy evaluation
literature (see Meyer 1995; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). Our control structure
is twofold: temporal, as we compare one particular product’s purchases in weeks with and
without labels; and cross-sectional, as we compare purchases of similar types of products
between the treatment and the selected control stores. We look at wine products in the three
different subgroups defined by treatment status. That is, we look at the labeled products
with scores, the unlabeled products with scores, and finally the unlabeled products with no
scores.
Let a product i be defined as a wine option in a certain store. The DID model specification
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is as follows :
(1)
Qigm = αi + β1Priceigm + β2Treated Storeig + β3Treatment Periodm+
+β4(Treated Store*Treated Period)igm + β5Digm + igm
where Qigm is the quantity sold of product i in product treatment status group g and month
m, αi is a product fixed effect, Priceigm is the unit price of product i in product group g and
month m, Digm is the a discount dummy if the product i in product group g and month m
is on sales, Treated Storeig is an indicator for product i in treatment status group g being in
the treated store. A time indicator Treatment Periodm is equal to zero in the pre treatment
period and equal to one in the treatment period.
The coefficient of interest is of the interaction of Treated Storeig and the Treatment
Periodm. When estimating equation (1) separately for g =(Treated Wines, Untreated Wines
with Scores, Un-scored Wines), we obtain three coefficients of β4, which are the average
effect of the treatment on the wine demand of each of the subgroups of products defined by
treatment status.
4.2 Heterogeneity and tests for Belief Updating
To investigate the heterogeneity of the effects according to observable product attributes we
split data into four subsets in the treated status: high score and low price quartile, high
score and high price quartile, low score and low price quartile, and finally low score and high
price quartile. Score range allows testing if revealing higher scores are associated with larger
demand responses. Price range allows testing for pre treatment consumer beliefs about wine
quality. We then estimate the equation 1 for the four data subsets.
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If the estimated β4 for the high score low price subset is positive and significant, then
we reject that consumers believed pre treatment that a low price signaled high quality (as
in Mahenc, 2004, Spence, 1976, and Tellis and Wernerfelt, 1987). However, if β4 is not
significantly different from zero for the high score high price wines, we find evidence consistent
with Shapiro (1983) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) that similar to pre treatment beliefs,
consumers believe that all else equal a high price means high quality. This also remains true
if β4 is not significantly different from zero for low scoring low price quartile wines. We do
not have enough observations in the high price low score set to perform an empirical test for
that group.
4.3 Test for spillover effects
When scores are revealed while holding constant other attributes, such as price (pre- and post
treatment), brand, and varietal, consumers may update the way they use price in conjunction
with other attributes as a quality signal in the post treatment period. We investigate whether
there are some spillover effects due to belief updating, by observing consumers revealed
preferences of unlabeled wines that share similar characteristics of labeled scored wines. In
this last specification, we test for spillover effects by taking advantage of having collected
varietal and brand name attribute data for all wines.
In particular, for each wine, we compute variable that measure the proportion of wines
that are treated by brand and varietal. We also compute a variable defined as the average
score of treated wines in the same brand of each wine, and a variable defined as the average
score of treated wines in the same varietal. To test for spillovers within brands, we test
whether or not the degree of treatment within a given brand allows increasing demand for
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wines in the same brand. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero we reject the
null of no spillovers. We also perform the same investigation to test for spillovers within
varietals. Lastly, we compare the estimates of brand and varietal spillovers.
5 Results
This section is organized as follows. First we present the average treatment effects on the
treated wines. Then we turn to presenting heterogeneity estimates by score and by price
range and testing belief updating about quality of wines. Finally, we look at spillovers among
the treated wines and investigate whether there are spillover effects into unlabeled scored
wines as well as unscored wines.
5.1 Average Treatment Effects on Treated Wines
We present the results from the reduced form specification of equation (1) in Table 2, where
the dependent variable in the first two columns is the quantity of bottles sold of wine product i
at store s and month-of-sample m and the ln of quantity in column (3). The first row contains
the estimated treatment effects coefficient of the difference in differences interaction of the
“Treated Store and Treated Period” dummy variables, rows two and three report the average
quantity change for the treated store and the treated period, respectively. In column (2), we
report on a specification with the addition of a price variable and a dummy variable that
indicates whether or not the product is discounted, while Column (3) repeats the specification
in column (2) with quantities and prices in ln’s.
Treated products sell an average of 15 bottles a month and during the treatment period,
and average demand drops for both the treatment and the control stores given the negative
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albeit not significant coefficient of -3.277 in levels in column (2) which corresponds to a 19.3
percent decline given in (3). As already show in Figure 2, average quantity is lower for
the Treated store than for the controls, which is reiterated by the negative and significant
point estimate of “Treated Store”, by about 3 bottles, or 18.6 percent. The price coefficient is
statistically different from zero and negative in all specifications. Given the ln-ln specification
in column (3), we can interpret the coefficient on Price as a price elasticity. This coefficient
equals -2.671, which ultimately means that demand for wine is elastic. Finally, average
quantity sold increases by 55.7 percent when products are discounted.
In all three columns of Table 2, the coefficients on the interaction terms “Treated Store
X Treated Period” are positive. For the specification in levels we see that revealing scores
increased wine demand by 1.5 bottles, about 5 percent, and the increase is statistically
different from zero, suggesting that wine product sales decreased less in the treated store
in the treated period than in the control stores, leading to a positive average treatment
effect. For the ln-ln specification the coefficient is 0.052, but not statistically different from
zero.6 Next, we show heterogeneity by score levels and along other observable attributes for
different subsets of wines according to treatment status.
5.2 Treatment effects by Score Levels on Treated Wines
To further understand whether and how consumers change demand for different types of
wine, we estimate equation (1) by interacting the treatment effect with the displayed level
6Our results are consistent with those of Hilger et al (2011) but the point estimates are not the same because
we use a different set of control stores to estimate the average treatment effect here. In particular, we match
the treatment store to the best controls in terms of pre period trends for not only the treated wines but also
for the untreated wines with and without scores, and use four control stores.
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of Score and present the estimates in column (1) of Table 3. In column (2) we estimate
(1) for the subset of scores below the median score of 81 and in column (3) for wines with
scores 81 and higher. We find that the higher the scores the larger the percent increase of
bottles sold for treated wines. The coefficient of interest is the one for the row “Score Level
X Treated Store X Treated Period” and we see that if the score displayed increases by one,
then the number of bottles sold increases by 0.2 percent. Comparing columns (2) and (3)
treatment effects, those in the row “Treated Store X Treated Period”, we see that demand
for wines below a score of 81 does not increase significantly (estimate of 0.005) while for
scores 81 and higher demand increases significantly on average by 5.8 percent. In sum, we
find a significant positive average consumer response to expert opinion labels for wine and
significant demand increases for higher scoring wines.
5.3 Testing for Price and Wine Region Quality Belief in Pre-Period on Treated Wines
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates of equation (1) for treated wines with scores 81 or larger,
and for treated wines with score below 81, respectively. Both tables allow differentiating
per price range and wine regions: imported wines are in column (1), domestic wines are in
column (2), where they are all California wines, the lowest priced quartile wines are in column
(3) and the higher price quartiles in column (4). The coefficient of interest is, as before, the
difference in differences interaction coefficient, the β4 in equation (1) which corresponds to
the row “Treated Store X Treated Period”. The null is that demand for each of this subset
of wines does not change significantly with our treatment.
For domestic wines in column (1), we only reject the null that there is no treatment
effect for score 81 and larger given that the coefficient on the “Treated Store X Treated
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Period” interaction, β4, is positive and significant. Our treatment caused “Domestic” wines
with scores 81 or more to increase by 14.7 percent, consistent with consumers updating their
beliefs about domestically produced wines if they receive scores of 81 or higher. In contrast,
the demand for imported wines in column (2) drops significantly by 26 percent due to the
treatment for high scoring imported wines, suggesting that consumers switch away from high
scoring foreign wines to domestic wines with high scores. This is consistent with consumers
associating domestic wines with lower quality than imported wines – a belief that changes
once the scores are revealed, leading demand for domestic wines to increase and demand for
imported wines to drop.
From the estimates of columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 we see that the estimated β4 for
the high score low price subset is positive and significant, which leads us to reject that
consumers believed pre treatment that a low price signaled high quality (as predicted by
Mahenc, 2004, Spence, 1976, and Tellis and Wernerfelt, 1987). Indeed, treated high quality
wines in the lowest price quartile increase by 18.1 percent due to the treatment. In addition,
the estimated β4 is not significantly different from zero for the high score high price wines
in column (5). Taken together, we find evidence consistent with Shapiro (1983) and Bagwell
and Riordan (1991), namely that consumers already believe in the pre treatment period
that a high price means high quality. This is reinforced by the fact that the estimate of
β4 in column (3) of Table 5 is not significantly different from zero for low scoring low price
quartile wines. Revealing low scores for imported and also for domestic wines does not cause
a significant change in demand, given the non-significant estimates in columns (1) and (2)
of Table 5.
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5.4 Belief Updating due to Spill Over Effects within and across Treatment Status
We want to investigate here whether, when scores are revealed under the unchanged (pre
and post experiment) price distribution of available choices, brand and varietal, consumers
update the way they use price in conjunction with all other attributes in order to infer quality
in the post period. We test for belief updating in the form of spillover effects on unlabeled
wines.
We compute a variable that features the average score of treated wines in the same brand
of each wine, and a variable that features the average score of treated wines in the same
varietal, especially given that the wine bottles are organized on the shelves by varietals rather
than by wine brand. The test for spillovers is to test whether the magnitude of treatment
within brand causes demand to increase or not for wines in the same brand, and perform the
same empirical analysis within varietal taking advantage of the variation in the intensity of
treatment by brand and varietal and also of the variation in average scores for treated wines
by brands and varietals.
There are a total of 375 wine brands, where 297 of them have none of their products
treated. However, for the remaining 76 wine brands, we have 6.37 percent of treated wines
within a brand on average, with a standard deviation of 15.6. There are 4 brands that have
all their available wines treated and some that have no wine treated, and the remaining
72 brands have intensity of treatments ranging between 4.5% and 66%. The intensity of
treatment also varies among the 14 different varietals: on average 6.99% of wines in a varietal
are treated and four varietals have no wines treated while the remaining ten varietals intensity
of treatment ranges between 4.76% and 22% of wines treated.
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In terms of average scores, among the 10 varietals that get treated the average score
ranges between a varietal with an average score of 81.7 and a varietal with an average score
of 89 among its treated wines. In terms of brand level variation in average scores, we have
one brand with an average score of its treated wines being a 78 and one other brand with
the highest average score among its treated wines being a 89. In between, average brand
level scores range from 79 to 88 for their treated products, and the brand level average score
is 83.6 with a standard deviation of 2.65.
Table 6 investigates within brand spillovers and reports the estimates in four columns
according to treatment status and score levels for each subgroup of wines in the sample.
Column (1) has treated wines with scores lower than 81, column (2) has treated wines with
scores 81 or higher, column (3) has untreated wines with scores 81 or higher and column (4)
has the group of wines without any scores.
The coefficients of interest are the ones associated with “Treated Store-Period X Average
Score by Brand” and also “Treated Store-Period X Percent Treated by Brand”. Given that
the coefficients are not significantly different from zero in column (1) for the average and
intensity of treatment by brand rows, we reject there to be within brand spillovers for treated
wines of low score level. However, for the high scoring treated wines, we find that there are
positive spillovers. In particular, we find that a one percent increase in the intensity of
treated wines in a brand portfolio significantly causes the number of wine bottles to increase
given the significant point estimate of 96.9% as shown in column (2). Given that among the
treated brands, the range of treatment by brand is 4.5% and 66%, if the percentage of wines
treated by brand increased to 66%, wine bottles would increase by 63.9% for each wine in
the same brand that got treated.
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For the untreated group that has scores higher than 81, in column (3), we reject the null
of no spillovers. The coefficient of average score of treated wines in the same brand is positive
and significant meaning that the high quality spills over to untreated wines belonging to the
same brand portfolio of high average scored brands. Moreover, the coefficient associated
with the percent treated by brand is negative and significant. This implies that consumers
perceive the wines that receive no labels as being of low quality. While brands that receive
high average scores benefit from positive spillovers to its untreated brands with scores, the
more wines that receive a score within a brand, then the more consumers perceive the wines
receiving no labels as being of poor quality.
For the unscored wines in column (4) we reject the null of no spillovers. In fact, the
estimates of average score and percent treated within brand spillover measures are both
significant and positive. This is consistent with consumers inferring that if a product belongs
to a brand that has in general high scores or is highly labeled then the unlabeled product
must be good. As a result, they associate brand with high scores affiliation with high
quality. Both columns (3) and (4) measure spillovers into sales of wines that do not receive
a treatment label. While we see that having a product in its brand that received a higher
average scores has positive and significant spillovers for both untreated products with scores
(in column 3) and untreated products without scores (in column 4), it is quite interesting
that we see differences between column (3) and column (4) in terms of spillovers by intensity
of treatment. For the group that never received a score (group in column 4) we find that
they benefit from high intensity of treatment within its brand portfolio, while in column (3)
it is the exact opposite, given the negative and significant point estimate associated with
the intensity of treatment within brand. These are different types of wines: the sample of
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wines in column (3) has scores higher than 81 and the sample in column (4) would likely get
a score less than 81 if scored. As a take away it appears that the spillover effects from the
brand level intensity of treatment benefit significantly the worse untreated wines relative to
the higher scoring wines.
Table 7 presents the estimates used to test for spillovers within varietals. Table 7 is
organized the same way as Table 6 and only the coefficients in column (2) reject there to be
no spillovers. For the sample of wines with scores 81 or higher, we find that higher average
scores within varietal, lowers demand for treated wines in the same varietal. Additionally,
the higher the intensity of treatment within varietal, the larger the increase in demand for
treated wines of scores 81 or higher.
6 Conclusion
We empirically estimate the effect on wine demand from revealing expert opinion information
about the quality of a subset of products in the choice set of consumers. We not only estimate
average effects, but we break up the effects by subsets of groups of labeled and unlabeled
wines to investigate and test possible theoretical mechanisms as to how expert opinion labels
can reveal the way consumers make inference about the quality and compare among products
in the context of incomplete information.
First, we find there to be a positive and significant overall average effect of the changes
in information provision in the form of expert opinion on consumer preferences for the wine
products labeled relative to the control products. There is also heterogeneity in the estimated
effects in that demand increases more for higher score wines than for lower score wines as in
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Hilger et al (2011) using even more data on wine choices. We estimate there to be spillovers
effects of this experimental treatment within brand for untreated wines. If wines do not
receive a label they do significantly benefit from average scores within the same brand but,
if many products are labeled for the same brand we find evidence consistent with consumers
inferring that the unlabeled wines for the same brand are of low quality and demand drops.
This is not the case for varietial.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature as it uses actual revealed preferences
where price is perceived as being positively correlated with wine quality when consumers have
incomplete information. We find that consumers update their beliefs of low prices signaling
lower quality, all else equal, given that they increase demand for lower quartile priced wines
that have a high score. This result is consistent with previous literature findings of wine
tasting experiments and choice surveys (see e.g., Mastrobuoni, et al, 2014).
Our findings are also consistent with pre treatment consumers inferring high quality for
high prices, given that once quality is revealed, demand does not move for those higher priced
wine quartiles as in Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and Shapiro (1983). We also reject that low
price signalled high quality in the pre-period because revealing scores increases demand for
those wines. If consumers already perceived low priced wines as high quality (as in Mahenc,
2004, Spence, 1976, and Tellis and Wernerfelt, 1987), then revealing scores should not have
significantly changed demand for those low price wines. Future work could consider the
extent that firms would likely respond to the additional quality information when deciding
prices and product assortments.
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Figure 1: Histogram of Scores by Status of Wines in Treated and Control Stores
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Scores by Status in Treated Store (Left) and Control Stores (Right)
Note: There are scores available for wines pertaining to two status: Labeled status means these wine products are labeled and treated in the treated store. Unlabeled Status
are the wines that have scores but do not receive a label with a score, thus are not treated in the Treated Store. The left panel displays the kernel density estimates of the
score distribution for labeled and unlabeled wine products int e treated store. The right panel displays the kernel density estimates of the score distribution in control stores
for the same group of wine products labeled and unlabeled (receiving a label and unlabeled in the treated store), given that we can see the same products in the control stores,
which will be our counterfactuals in the difference in difference estimation strategy. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for equality of the Distrib in each of the panels cannot
reject the equality of scores distribution in the treated and also in the control stores between the labeled and unlabeled status of wines , given that KS (pvalue) is for the
Treated Store= 0.0987 (0.481) and for the Control Stores =0.0935 (0.518).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Wines by Treatment Status for Treated and Control Stores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated Store Control Stores
Treated Untreated Wines Untreated Wines Treated Untreated Wines Untreated Wines
Wines With Scores Without Scores Wines With Scores Without Scores
Quantity (March) 16.99 25.60 11.97 19.19 29.06 13.42
(26.01) (44.90) (21.57) (26.01) (53.28) (23.75)
Quantity (April) 14.88 22.08 10.31 16.93 24.56 11.21
(22.23) (40.35) (17.96) (22.53) (47.45) (19.70)
Price (March) 10.98 10.15 10.98 11.23 10.38 11.36
(5.00) (4.81) (6.43) (5.02) (4.91) (6.50)
Price (April) 10.96 10.07 10.93 10.97 10.31 11.38
(5.15) (4.73) (6.14) (4.83) (5.13) (6.40)
% discounted (March) 0.91 0.99 0.75 0.88 0.99 0.74
% discounted (April) 0.88 0.99 0.78 0.89 0.98 0.75
Score 83.13 83.65 83.05 83.68
(3.20) (3.20) (3.29) (3.01)
% red 0.58 0.45 0.50 0.59 0.46 0.51
% white 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.34 0.46 0.39
Average Score by Brand
Average 83.05
Min - Max Score 78 - 89
% Treated by Brand 6.37
Min - Max % Treated 0-100
Average Score by Varietal
Average 83.59
Min - Max 81.7 - 89
% Treated by Varietal 6.99
Min - Max % Treated 0 - 22
Number Brands 375
Number Varietals 14
Number Wines 101 230 563 102 235 599
Number Observations 2562 5721 16194 11058 24578 72871
Standard Deviations in parentheses. First three columns for Treated Store, next three for Control stores.
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Figure 2: Monthly Quantities Sold by Store
All Wines Treated Wines
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Table 2: Difference-in-Difference: Average Effect of Expert Opinion Labels on Retail Wine Sales
(1) (2) (3)
Quantity Sold (Q) Q ln(Q)
Treated Store X Treated Period 1.520∗∗∗ 1.507∗∗∗ 0.052
(0.245) (0.240) (0.046)
Treated Store -3.104∗∗∗ -3.419∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.266) (0.015)
Treated Period -1.851 -3.277 -0.193
(3.345) (2.797) (0.171)
Price -2.756∗∗∗
(0.127)
Discount Dummy 2.717∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗
(0.592) (0.048)
ln(Price) -2.671∗∗∗
(0.135)
Mean of Dep. Variable 15.118 15.118 1.943
Num of Obs. 13619 13619 13617
R squared 0.462 0.498 0.595
Product FE X X X
Clustered errors in parentheses at the month level. Controls are best 4 stores. The dependent
variable is the quantity by product sold per month except the last column, which is ln quantity sold.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
34
Table 3: Difference-in-Difference: Score Level Effect of Expert Opinion Labels on Retail Wine Sales
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Q) ln(Q) and Score < 81 ln(Q) and Score > 80
ln(Price) -2.671∗∗∗ -2.976∗∗∗ -2.590∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.217) (0.150)
Discount Dummy 0.556∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.051) (0.055)
Score Level X Treated Store X Treated Period 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Treated Store X Treated Period -0.060 0.005 0.058∗∗
(0.060) (0.156) (0.025)
Treated Store -0.186∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.029) (0.018)
Treated Period -0.193 -0.317∗ -0.165
(0.171) (0.163) (0.171)
Mean of Dep. Variable 1.943 2.154 1.893
Num of Obs. 13617 2609 11008
R squared 0.595 0.553 0.600
Product FE X X X
Clustered errors in parentheses. Clusters are at the month level. The dependent
variable is ln quantity in all the other columns.
In Column 3 only wines with Scores Less than 81, and Column 4 Wines with Scores greater and Equal to 81.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Score Level Effect of Expert Opinion Labels on Retail Wine Sales Scores 81 or Higher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imported California=Domestic First Quartile Price Highest Quartiles Price
ln(Price) -2.884∗∗∗ -2.539∗∗∗ -2.873∗∗∗ -2.554∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.167) (0.403) (0.137)
Discount Dummy 0.425∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.062) (0.094) (0.056)
Treated Store X Treated Period -0.261∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.025) (0.034) (0.047) (0.025)
Treated Store -0.123∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.022) (0.045) (0.017)
Treated Period -0.177 -0.161 -0.231 -0.156
(0.152) (0.175) (0.157) (0.173)
Mean of Dep. Variable 1.699 1.940 2.387 1.813
Num of Obs. 2123 8885 1545 9463
R squared 0.612 0.595 0.567 0.595
Product FE X X X X
Clustered errors in parentheses. Clusters are at the month level. The dependent
variable is the ln quantity in all columns and only featuring Wines Scored 81 of More.
In Column 1 imported wines, in column 2 domestic (all California) Wines,
Column 3 Lowest Quartile Priced Wines, Column 4 higher Quartile Price Wines.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Score Level Effect of Expert Opinion Labels on Retail Wine Sales Scores below 81
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic Imported First Quartile Price Higher Quartiles Price
ln(Price) -1.423∗∗ -3.396∗∗∗ -3.287∗∗∗ -2.571∗∗∗
(0.646) (0.184) (0.208) (0.404)
Discount Dummy 0.750∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.043) (0.092) (0.081)
Treated Store X Treated Period 1.068∗∗∗ 0.586 -0.050 0.093
(0.137) (0.620) (0.253) (0.088)
Treated Store -0.363∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.008) (0.050) (0.057)
Treated Period -1.034∗∗∗ -0.152 -0.563∗∗∗ -0.086
(0.263) (0.161) (0.148) (0.191)
Score Level X Treated Store X Treated Period -0.008
(0.007)
Mean of Dep. Variable 1.690 2.021 2.579 1.765
Num of Obs. 151 6489 1245 1364
R squared 0.218 0.579 0.553 0.427
Product FE X X X X
Clustered errors in parentheses. Clusters are at the month level. The dependent
variable is the ln quantity in all columns and only featuring Wines Scored Less than 81.
In Column 1 imported wines, in column 2 domestic (all California) wines
in column 3 Lowest Quartile Priced Wines, Column 4 higher Quartile Price Wines. Not enough observations in this sample for Imported wines.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 6: Spillover Effects of Expert Opinion Labels on Retail Wine Sales Within Brand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Price) -2.655∗∗∗ -2.981∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗∗ -2.055∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.220) (0.265) (0.083)
Discount Dummy 0.587∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.052) (0.068) (0.039)
Treated Store X Treated Period 0.172 -2.593 0.191 -0.291∗∗∗
(0.547) (1.832) (0.350) (0.081)
Treated Store-Period X Avg Score by Brand -0.001 0.031 0.022∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.007) (0.021) (0.006) (0.001)
Treated Store-Period X Percent Treated by Brand -4.764 96.941∗∗ -2198.940∗∗ 25.525∗∗∗
(4.592) (39.626) (962.632) (5.334)
Treated Store X Average Score by Brand -0.002 0.012∗∗ 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Treated Store X Percent Treated by Brand 6.377∗ -18.342 -28.109∗∗ -8.399
(3.239) (31.236) (12.723) (5.415)
Treated Period X Percent Treated by Brand 4.878 -52.793∗∗ -48.759∗ 4.279
(5.935) (20.305) (22.671) (14.757)
Treated Period X Average Score by Brand -0.005 -0.008∗∗ 0.001 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Treated Store 0.007 -1.157∗∗∗ 0.107 -0.162∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.340) (0.156) (0.051)
Treated Period 0.226 0.390 -0.276 -0.014
(0.469) (0.420) (0.261) (0.172)
Mean of Dep. Variable 1.953 2.154 1.040 1.716
Num of Obs. 9550 2609 701 24270
R squared 0.606 0.557 0.278 0.604
Product FE X X X X
Clustered errors in parentheses. Clusters are at the month level. The dependent
variable is the ln quantity in all columns. Column (1) has treated wines with scores lower than 81,
Column (2) has treated wines with scores 81 and higher,
Column (3) has untreated wines with scores 81 and higher, Column (4) has untreated wines without scores (for which we
do not have available score information from experts. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 7: Spillover Effects of Expert Opinion Labels on Retail Wine Sales Within Varietal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Price) -2.600∗∗∗ -2.973∗∗∗ -1.266∗∗∗ -2.082∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.220) (0.162) (0.057)
Discount Dummy 0.572∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.052) (0.044) (0.027)
Treated Store X Treated Period 0.491 2.422∗∗∗ 4.671 0.110
(0.492) (0.480) (3.074) (0.145)
Treated Store-Period X Average Score by Varietal -0.004 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.072 -0.001
(0.008) (0.012) (0.057) (0.003)
Treated Store-Period X Percent Treated by Varietal -96.594 811.139∗ -171.502 -44.117
(70.401) (376.050) (667.436) (79.485)
Treated Store X Avg Score by Varietal -0.003∗∗ -0.010∗ -0.011 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.001)
Treated Store X Percent Treated by Varietal 42.731∗∗ 145.838 -459.277∗ 91.952∗∗∗
(17.085) (168.747) (221.059) (9.672)
Treated Period X Percent Treated by Varietal 148.570∗∗∗ -207.558 -251.699 38.832∗∗
(31.031) (122.851) (265.468) (13.484)
Treated Period X Avg Score by Varietal -0.004 0.006 0.047 -0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.029) (0.001)
Treated Store 0.027 0.350 1.421∗∗ -0.098∗∗
(0.098) (0.325) (0.625) (0.035)
Treated Period -0.051 -0.538 -3.339∗ 0.140
(0.109) (0.434) (1.829) (0.139)
Mean of Dep. Variable 1.893 2.154 0.983 1.592
Num of Obs. 11008 2609 943 90588
R squared 0.601 0.554 0.278 0.559
Product FE X X X X
Clustered errors in parentheses. Clusters are at the month level. The dependent
variable is the ln quantity in all columns. Column (1) has treated wines with scores lower than 81,
Column (2) has treated wines with scores 81 and higher,
Column (3) has untreated wines with scores 81 and higher, Column (4) has untreated wines without scores (for which we
do not have available score information from experts. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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